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Abstract—The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was one of the most
devastating tsunamis in world history. The tsunami caused damage
to most of the Asian and other countries bordering the Indian
Ocean. After a decade, reconstruction has been completed with
different levels of tsunami countermeasures in most areas; how-
ever, some land use planning using probabilistic tsunami hazard
maps and vulnerabilities should be addressed to prepare for future
tsunamis. Examples of early-stage reconstruction are herein pro-
vided alongside a summary of some of the major tsunamis that
have occurred since 2004, revealing the tsunami countermeasures
established during the reconstruction period. Our primary objective
is to report on and discuss the vulnerabilities found during our field
visits to the tsunami-affected countries—namely, Indonesia, Sri
Lanka, Thailand and the Maldives. For each country, future chal-
lenges based on current tsunami countermeasures, such as land use
planning, warning systems, evacuation facilities, disaster education
and disaster monuments are explained. The problem of traffic jams
during tsunami evacuations, especially in well-known tourist areas,
was found to be the most common problem faced by all of the
countries. The readiness of tsunami warning systems differed
across the countries studied. These systems are generally sufficient
on a national level, but local hazards require greater study. Disaster
reduction education that would help to maintain high tsunami
awareness is well established in most countries. Some geological
evidence is well preserved even after a decade. Conversely, the
maintenance of monuments to the 2004 tsunami appears to be a
serious problem. Finally, the reconstruction progress was evaluated
based on the experiences of disaster reconstruction in Japan. All
vulnerabilities discussed here should be addressed to create long-
term, disaster-resilient communities.
Key words: 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, reconstruction,
disaster preparedness, disaster risk reduction.
1. Introduction
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami remains the
deadliest tsunami in recorded history. The earth-
quake, which had a magnitude Mw 9.3 and a rupture
length of approximately 1200 km (STEIN and OKAL
2005, 2007), triggered a tsunami that reached 30 m in
height (SYNOLAKIS and KONG 2006) and caused at least
230,000 fatalities in 15 African (FRITZ and BORRERO
2006; WEISS and BAHLBURG 2006) and Asian coun-
tries, such as Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the
Maldives (BORRERO et al. 2006; JAFFE et al. 2006;
GOFF et al. 2006; RUANGRASSAMEE et al. 2006; FRITZ
et al. 2006; OKAL et al. 2006a), and other island
countries in the Indian Ocean (OKAL et al. 2006b, c).
Lessons were learned and good practices were
developed as a result of this event. Far-field tsunami
hazards from other possible sources were also studied
after the 2004 event, focusing on various countries
(LØVHOLT et al. 2006; BURBIDGE et al. 2008; LATIEF
et al. 2008; OKAL and SYNOLAKIS 2008; SUPPASRI et al.
2012a, b). In addition, disaster risk-reduction ele-
ments, such as tsunami early warning systems,
evacuation buildings, tsunami memorials, tsunami
museums and disaster education programs, were
developed in this region. This paper presents a sum-
mary of the progress made with regard to disaster
preparedness over the last 10 years in Indonesia, the
Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand based on studies,
observations and our collaborative activities with
government and international counterparts in Japan.
This is somehow representative of efforts made by
other nations, including the US, Germany, France,
Australia, New Zealand and Chile. The main objec-
tives are as follows: (1) to report on the
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reconstruction and vulnerabilities after 10 years, (2)
to evaluate the present tsunami warning systems and
emergency response measures and (3) to discuss
disaster awareness in terms of education, memorials
and the geological evidence that remains and conveys
the risk of tsunami impacts. In considering the first
objective, we present a summary of the reconstruc-
tion of housing and vital infrastructure and the
restoration of businesses, land use and education in
the affected countries during the initial years after the
disaster. To address the second objective, large
earthquakes that have generated ocean-wide tsunami
warnings and have impacted the region are evaluated.
Finally, to address the third objective, we assess the
progress made with regard to disaster preparedness
and the future challenges faced in these areas.
2. Early Stage Reconstruction After the 2004 Indian
Ocean Tsunami
This section describes several examples of the
early-stage reconstruction conducted during the first
few years after the 2004 tsunami, including housing,
lifeline and business restoration, land use manage-
ment, disaster reduction education and the internal
conflicts.
2.1. Housing Reconstruction
Sri Lanka is used as an example here. The tsunami
hit the Eastern, Southern and Western coasts of Sri
Lanka 2–3 h after the earthquake, with maximum
measured run-up heights from several meters to 10 m
or more (GOFF et al. 2006). The tsunami killed more
than 31,000 people and destroyed 80,000 houses,
displacing more than 500,000 people (KHAZAI et al.
2006). Housing reconstruction was studied by MURAO
and NAKAZATO (2010), who used data on more than
56,000 transitional houses and 28,000 permanent
houses in the tsunami-damaged areas of Sri Lanka.
They computed the recovery ratio—the ratio of the
number of buildings constructed per month—to the
total number of completed buildings as of February
2006, 15 months after the tsunami. Approximately
50 % of the reconstruction was completed after
5 months for the transitional houses and after
8 months for the permanent houses. The transitional
houses were constructed mainly during the first
period after the tsunami, whereas the construction
of permanent houses began after careful evaluation
by the government and stakeholders. In Sri Lanka,
no-construction zones existed in areas that underwent
the rehabilitation process. The reconstruction and the
resettlement has been performed considering the
initial no-construction zones (FRANCO et al. 2013)
declared as 100 m in the South and West, 200 m in
the East, and 500 m in the North. However, these
initial no-construction zones obtained opposition
from the local community as they created severe
constraints on their daily lives and livelihoods, and as
a result the buffer zones were revised to 25–50 m in
the Southern Districts and a minimum of 50 m on the
Eastern coast. Although the 200, 500 and 25–50 m
no-construction zones are not arbitrary, broad no-
build zones still exist and affect people’s livelihoods.
2.2. Lifeline Infrastructure Reconstruction
A comparative study of lifeline reconstruction
between the cases of Okushiri Island, Japan, after the
1993 tsunami and Nam Khem village in Phang Nga
province of Thailand was performed by TAKADA et al.
(2010). They reported that the water and power
supply reconstruction in Nam Khem village took
approximately 1 and 3 months, respectively, whereas
the full recovery of lifelines took 5 years on Okushiri
Island. This difference was due to the preference of
the local residents of Nam Khem village to rebuild in
the same place where they had lived before the
tsunami. Therefore, the local residents were able to
move into their new permanent houses directly from
the evacuation shelter. Conversely, on Okushiri
Island, the local residents worked for many years
together with the local government to design a new,
resilient town to mitigate future disasters.
2.3. Business Restoration
A survey of business restoration was carried out in
Galle, Sri Lanka, in 2005 (KUWATA and TAKADA
2010). Galle, the capital city of Southern Sri Lanka
and known as the location where the tsunami swept
away a train with almost 2000 passengers, is located
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on the south tip of Sri Lanka where the tsunami
inundation depth measured more than 5 m (GOFF
et al. 2006). In this study, business restoration was
defined by the amount of sales of a product after the
tsunami compared to the amount of sales of the same
product before the tsunami. The data were obtained
through interviews with shop owners. Financial
services and lifelines were the two types of busi-
nesses that were restored most quickly. These
businesses were fully restored after 2 months because
both were considered important for the overall
reconstruction. Moreover, agricultural restoration
took approximately 6 months. Although the farmers
may be situated far away from the sea, the agricul-
tural sector took longer time to completely restore as
it was necessary to first remove contamination of the
soil due to salinity (KUWATA 2011). Tourism, man-
ufacturing and both wholesale and retail businesses
were slowly restored; approximately 50 % were
restored 6 months after the tsunami. One of the
reasons for this was the reduction in visiting inter-
national tourists. Fisheries suffered the most; less
than 40 % were restored 1 year after the event.
Reasons for this include the damage incurred by
fishing boats and the rumors of incurring health risks
from eating seafood from the area.
2.4. Land Use Management
An example of land use management as an
important adaptive strategy for tsunami resilience in
the Maldives was presented by RIYAZ and PARK
(2010). The Maldives is a country that is extremely
vulnerable to many types of hazard, i.e., storm surges,
torrential monsoon rain, sea level rise, tidal waves
and tsunamis. Unlike other countries in the Indian
Ocean, the average height of Maldivian islands is
1.5 m above Mean Sea Level which exacerbates the
challenges associated with the tsunami evacuation
process (Ministry of Environment, Energy and Water
2007). Therefore, the ‘‘Safer Island Concept’’ (FRITZ
et al. 2006) was proposed as follows: (1) establish
environmental protection zones (EPZs): high-level
sand bunds or embankments to protect the islands
from a high rise in sea level, (2) create lower drainage
areas on the landward side between the ring road and
the EPZ for proper water drainage and (3) build
elevated ground or high-rise buildings for vertical
evacuation. Vertical evacuation sites can act as a
good solution to the problem, but these sites must be
built to withstand the great impact, which includes
floating debris. The government of the Maldives
decided to pursue this concept on ten islands as a
long-term goal. However, only two islands have
presently been developed as ‘‘safer islands’’. In
addition, the two islands developed as ‘‘safer island’’
do not strictly follow the concept outlined above.
2.5. Disaster Reduction Education
Education is important in addition to reconstruc-
tion. Examples of new efforts in disaster reduction
education in Thailand, at the government level, and
Indonesia, at the local level, are discussed in this
section. SIRIPONG (2010) reported that, in Thailand,
three government agencies provide disaster reduction
education: (1) the Ministry of Education, for schools
and universities, (2) the Department of Disaster
Prevention and Mitigation, for operational and reha-
bilitative academies, and (3) the National Disaster
Warning Center. The role of each agency and their
collaboration with international organizations are
explained in the study. GOTO et al. (2010) introduced
an example of educational materials and methods at
the local level: a collaborative workshop between
Japanese and Indonesian universities. Visual educa-
tional aids, such as computer graphic of tsunami, and
exercises, such as evacuation drills and the prepara-
tion of evacuation maps, were judged to be effective
educational tools. YASUDA et al. (2014) present
similar activities in the 2004 tsunami-affected coun-
tries (Indonesia and Thailand), the 2011 tsunami-
affected area in Japan, and the 2013 Typhoon
Haiyan-affected area in the Philippines and Hawaii.
They found that after the activity, for example, 20 %
of the students changed their mind from agreeing to
totally agreeing to tell their parents what they have
learned in class.
2.6. Internal Conflicts
There are some examples of internal conflicts
associated with the early-stage reconstruction of this
tsunami disaster as both Indonesia and Sri Lanka had
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been affected by civil war for several decades before
the tsunami (BAUMAN et al; 2007; ENIA et al. 2008;
HYNDMAN 2009; KUHN 2009). Two of the main issues
raised during the early-stage reconstruction are (1)
public safety of post-tsunami buffer zone/empower-
ment issues among the government and rebels, and
(2) distribution of aid and goods from international
institutions (HYNDMAN 2009). However, the result of
the conflicts after the tsunami is different in both
countries. Banda Aceh achieved peace after an
agreement in 2005 and greater access of natural
resources such as oil and gas even before the tsunami.
On the other hand, civil war was renewed in Sri
Lanka with the loss of government power. These
examples suggest the need to pay more attention to
post disaster conflict zones given their potential of
both positive and negative ends (ENIA 2008).
3. Review of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Events After
2004 and Their Impacts
This section describes the three major tsunamis
triggered by earthquakes with magnitudes of
approximately M 8.0 or greater and their impacts on
countries bordering the Indian Ocean. These three
events occurred after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami:
the 2005 Nias earthquake, the 2007 Sumatra earth-
quake, the 2010 Mentawai earthquake and the 2012
Indian Ocean earthquakes, as shown in Fig. 1.
3.1. The 2005 Nias Earthquake and Tsunami
This earthquake occurred on 28 March 2005,
3 months after that of December 2004, with a
magnitude of M 8.7 (USGS 2005). The earthquake
was felt on the entire west coast of Malaysia and in
high-rise buildings in Singapore and Thailand, among
other countries. The ground motion reached as far as
the Andaman Islands, but it was not felt on the Indian
mainland (ASC 2005). The epicenter was located in a
shallow water region, producing a high-intensity
earthquake but a small tsunami. Based on field survey
data (BORRERO et al. 2011), the tsunami runup height
was approximately 4 m or less at areas near the
epicenter. These values are comparable to those of the
2004 tsunami at the same location. Smaller waves
were detected at tide gauges in the Indian Ocean in
comparison to the 2004 event shown in brackets: for
example, 0.10 m (1.08 m) in Male, the Maldives;
0.13 m (0.30 m) in the Cocos Islands, Australia; and
0.21 m (1.50 m) in Colombo, Sri Lanka (NOAA/
NGDC 2014). Tsunami warnings were issued by the
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center to many countries in
the region but were later cancelled. People in
Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand
evacuated to safer places by moving to higher ground,
whereas traffic jams occurred on the roads leading out
of Banda Aceh, Indonesia, and the coastal areas of
Chennai, India (ASC 2005). Fatalities were due
primarily to the strong ground motion in areas near
the epicenter; however, the USGS (2005) reported
that at least ten people died from panic during the
evacuation from the Sri Lankan coast.
3.2. The 2007 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami
Another large earthquake of magnitude M 8.5
(USGS 2007) occurred in this region on 12 Septem-
ber 2007, 3 years after the 2004 event. Similar to the
event in 2005, the earthquake was felt in countries as
far as Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, and high-
rise buildings were used for evacuation (BBC 2007).
In addition, tsunami warnings were issued to several
countries in and around the Indian Ocean, including
small islands and Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Sri
Lanka and even Kenya (BBC 2007). A moderate
tsunami with a runup height of approximately 4 m
was measured in the areas near the epicenter (BOR-
RERO et al. 2009). Relatively smaller tsunami waves
were observed at tide gauges in the Indian Ocean,
including 0.40 m in Phuket, Thailand; 0.11 m in
Male, the Maldives; 0.12 m in the Cocos Islands,
Australia; and 0.30 m in Colombo, Sri Lanka
(NOAA/NGDC 2014). Although the tsunami caused
destructive damage to buildings and facilities, no one
was killed due to the successful tsunami evacuation
following warning messages that reached residents
via TV or radio (IMAMURA 2008).
3.3. The 2010 Mentawai Earthquake and Tsunami
Although the magnitude of this earthquake (M
7.8) was smaller than the others discussed in this
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section, the number of casualties was the largest (as
high as 509) (NOAA/NGDC 2014). In fact, this
earthquake was considered a ‘‘tsunami earthquake’’
that generated a much larger tsunami than expected
from the seismic magnitude, insofar as the observed
tsunami was 4–7 m high (TOMITA et al. 2011; SATAKE
et al. 2013) and the maximum runup was measured as
high as 16.8 m (HILL et al. 2012). Issues that might
have magnified the damage and impact include the
following: (1) risk bias: the previous large earth-
quakes generated strong ground motions but did not
generate significant tsunami; the slow ground motion
during the 2010 earthquake thus brought a false sense
of safety, and most people thought that no tsunami
would follow (MUHARI and IMAMURA 2014); (2) the
earthquake occurred at night; (3) the earthquake
occurred in a location where there was less aware-
ness; and (4) there was no adequate tsunami warning
Figure 1
The locations of the major earthquakes in the Indian Ocean since 2004 and the population distribution, revealing the vulnerability of this
region. (Original data from Oak Ridge National Laboratory 2006)
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infrastructure to warn the local people. There was no
damage reported in the mainland areas where the
earthquake was felt, but the tsunami damaged the
remote Mentawai Islands, where the tsunami arrived
as soon as 5–15 min after the earthquake in some
areas. Here, there was also a problem with the
tsunami warning systems. Villagers were not given
early warning because some buoys had been vandal-
ized, and the equipment had been too expensive to
replace (The Telegraph 2010). However, some com-
munities, particularly those residing in the northern
part of the affected areas—which is famous for its
surfing activities—were able to evacuate; the evac-
uation was possible not because of the warning but
because of the surfers’ guidance (MIKAMI et al. 2014).
Therefore, this event signifies the importance of
education for self-evacuation, especially in such
remote areas or areas where tsunamis could arrive
swiftly. The 2010 tsunami was also observed in other
countries, reaching heights of 0.09 m in Colombo, Sri
Lanka; 0.11 m in Male, the Maldives; and 0.16 m in
the Cocos Islands, Australia (NOAA/NGDC 2014).
3.4. The 2012 Indian Ocean Earthquakes
and Tsunami
The last two sizable events were both outer-rise
earthquakes (an unusual type of earthquake that
occurs near oceanic trenches; GEIST et al. 2009) of
magnitudes over M 8.0 that occurred in North
Sumatra on 11 April 2012. One of the earthquakes
had a magnitude of M 8.6, whereas the second
earthquake presented with a magnitude of M 8.2;
they were located 100 and 200 km southwest of the
major subduction zone (USGS 2012), respectively.
They were felt in areas as far away as Malaysia,
Thailand, India and the Maldives, and tsunami
warnings were issued for all countries bordering
the Indian Ocean (Aljazeera 2012). Residents of
Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and India were
advised to move to high ground or to stay far away
from the sea. Nevertheless, due to the strike-slip
type of these earthquakes, no significant damage
was reported in the countries surrounding the Indian
Ocean, and the tsunami height was recorded at
approximately 0.05 m in Phuket, Thailand; 0.08 m
in the Cocos Islands, Australia; 0.21 m in Male, the
Maldives; and 1.08 m in the port of Meulaboh,
Aceh, Indonesia (NOAA/NGDC 2014).
3.5. Return Period of the 2004 Event-Like
Earthquake
One important issue is the recurrence of major
tsunami such as the 2004 event. Information of the
earthquake return period in the Indian Ocean basin
can be obtained from the following studies. BURBIDGE
et al. (2008) derived hazard curves representing the
earthquake return period as a function of magnitude
in Java, Sumatra, Nankai, Seram and South Chile.
The data were mainly based on the earthquake focal
mechanisms of all the earthquakes in the Global
CMT catalogue for the eastern Indian Ocean region
since 1976 with Mw C 7.0 and depths less than
100 km. Because records of seismicity are rarely long
enough, they proposed their own method developed
to avoid underestimating the return period due to
infrequent earthquake events in the area. From their
proposed hazard curve, it was estimated that a 2004
tsunami-class earthquake might occur every
1000 years.
A similar earthquake return period was shown in a
study by LATIEF et al. (2008). They considered four
main subduction segments as tsunamigenic sources in
Aceh-Seumelue-Andaman and Nias. The analysis
was conducted using the EZ-FRISK program to
provide a hazard curve correlating earthquake return
periods and the potential moment magnitudes while
considering the seismic parameters adopted in the
recurrence models. Their results indicate that the
recurrence of an event comparable to the 2004
tsunami is approximately 520 years.
Another method for calculating the earthquake
return period was used in an investigation of sand
sheets in Phang Nga province, Thailand (JANKAEW
et al. 2008). From the results of this study, it was
concluded that the full-sized predecessor to the 2004
tsunami occurred about 550–700 years ago. The
same survey method was conducted in Aceh
province, Indonesia (MONECKE et al. 2008). They
concluded that the recurrence of the 2004 tsunami is
about 600 years which agrees with the estimation by
LATIEF et al. (2008) and JANKAEW et al. (2008).
Therefore, approximately 600 years may be
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considered a suitable number for the return period of
the 2004 event such as earthquake. This information
is very important for disaster planning and policy-
making.
4. The Situation in Indonesia
4.1. Overview
In contrast to Japan, which has a long history of
tsunami disasters and has implemented countermea-
sures, the word ‘‘tsunami’’ was not commonly heard
and its impacts were not well understood in Sumatra
prior to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, even though
there were some major tsunami events prior to the
2004 event such as the 1992 Flores and the 1994 Java
tsunamis. The tsunami of 2004 destroyed 120,000
homes and heavily damaged 70,000 more, destroying
3000 government buildings (including hospitals and
schools) and 14 seaports. Nearly 3000 km of roads in
this region were damaged, and 150,000 people lost
their lives. Overall, the tsunami affected 800 km of
Indonesia’s coastline, with a total affected area of
413 km2 (SAMEK et al. 2004).
Because of the breadth and scale of the disaster,
the Indonesian government established a special
agency, called the Agency for Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation in Aceh and Nias (BRR Aceh-Nias), to
conduct reconstruction activities in Banda Aceh and
the surrounding areas. This agency began to operate
in mid-2005. With only a 4-year tenure, reconstruc-
tion activities focused on the development of housing
(2005 to mid-2007), the development of public
infrastructure (2005–2008), institutional and social
development (2005 to mid-2009) and economic
development (2005–2009). The agency’s overall
reconstruction expenses were 6.7 billion USD, which
came from the Indonesian government (37 %), bilat-
eral and multilateral donors (36 %), and national and
international non-governmental organizations
(27 %).
The redevelopment of the Aceh region was
conducted with a community participatory method
at the village level. For instance, a community
would decide whether its area would be rebuilt using
land consolidation or if it would be left as it was.
Along with these village-level reconstruction efforts,
facilities and infrastructure for future tsunami mit-
igation were also designed at a higher level. A field
visit was organized in November 2014 to observe
these facilities as shown in Fig. 2. Buildings for
vertical evacuation are now ready for use in Banda
Aceh (Fig. 3a), and evacuation routes have been
tested in national and international tsunami drills, in
which all countries affected by the 2004 tsunami
performed the drills. Recognizing that experiencing
the enormity of a tsunami is important, the media
has been employed to disseminate the tsunami-
related experiences from 2004 to future generations
in various forms. A tsunami museum (Fig. 3b) was
established in Banda Aceh along with 85 tsunami
poles that indicate the height of the tsunami that hit
the area. Other forms of memorials, such as ships
(Fig. 3c), including a large diesel power plant vessel
that was carried approximately 3 km inland, were
left in place as a memorial for future generations
(Fig. 3d).
4.2. Development of Tsunami Early Warning Systems
The development of a tsunami early warning
system has been one of the major initiatives in
Indonesia since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. It
was first developed under cooperation between the
Indonesian and German governments in 2005
(MU¨NCH et al. 2011; PARIATMONO 2012). It was
launched in 2009 and the present status is reviewed
by LAUTERJUNG et al. (2015). Since its development,
the system has been tested by both near- and far-field
actual tsunamis (MUHARI and IMAMURA 2014). The
primary aim of an early warning system is to
disseminate the information that a tsunami might
occur after the occurrence of an earthquake; the
Indonesian tsunami early warning system (Ina-
TEWS) is able to issue a tsunami warning within
5 min after an earthquake (PARIATMONO 2012).
Tsunami buoys are not yet integrated in the
overall warning system. The buoys are managed by
an institution, which is separate from BMKG (Badan
Meteorology, Klimatologi dan Geofisika, or the
Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics Agency).
The challenge this system faces is not only when the
warning is issued but also when the warning should
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be cancelled. During the 2010 Mentawai earthquake,
the warning was terminated 51 min after the earth-
quake, although the tsunami was still occurring up to
2 h later, particularly in the small bays in the remote
Mentawai Islands (MUHARI and IMAMURA 2014). The
decision to terminate the warning was made after
considering real-time data from the nearest tide
gauges, which indicated the tsunami height was only
as high as 0.22 m (in Enggano) prior to the warning’s
termination (BMKG 2010). However, those tide
gauges were located approximately 300 km away
from the source (Fig. 5). Near the source, in the
southern part of the Mentawai Islands, located only
50 km from the rupture area, the tsunami height was
much higher, ranging from 2 m to a maximum of
17 m, as observed on the small Sibigau Island located
near South Pagai Island (HILL et al. 2012; SATAKE
et al. 2013).
Moreover, during the 2011 Japan tsunami, the
tsunami warning in the east Indonesian region was
terminated just after the first wave arrived. However,
the largest wave came 1 h later and caused the death
of a local who had returned to the lowland after
receiving notice that the warning had been terminated
(DIPOSAPTONO et al. 2013). The lack of real-time
measurement data for continuously updating the
warning level or for indicating whether a tsunami
has been generated is one of the issues that needs to
be resolved. In addition, disseminating warnings in
remote areas, such as small islands, is another
challenge for future improvements to the system.
From the perspective of warning dissemination,
even though the National Tsunami Warning Center
(BMKG) had successfully issued a warning within
5 min after the earthquake, the local sirens did not
sound because they relied on the affected city’s
Figure 2
Locations in Banda Aceh, Indonesia mentioned in this study
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electricity, which was usually automatically shut off
during the earthquake. Manual activation of the sirens
was difficult because the officer in charge of them
also evacuated after the earthquake. Such a practical
problem should be addressed to ensure safe evacu-
ation in the future.
4.3. Tsunami Evacuation Condition
The other issue is the human response to warnings.
The 2012 Indian Ocean earthquake was likely the best
opportunity to test the preparedness of the people of
Banda Aceh against tsunamis. The magnitude M 8.6
earthquake triggered a massive evacuation even
though the tsunami sirens in Banda Aceh did not
sound until 70 min after the initial shock. Most of the
people evacuated using motorcycles to quickly escape
the lowland area. Although vertical evacuation
buildings were available in the lowland, most of the
residents did not believe that the structures could
withstand the earthquake and tsunami. The majority of
people in Banda Aceh thought that horizontal evac-
uation was the best choice. As a result, massive traffic
jams were observed along the main road of Banda
Aceh City during the evacuation. According to a
survey conducted after the event (GOTO et al. 2012c)
among 161 people who evacuated (of the total 220
respondents), 153 were trapped in the traffic jam
during the evacuation. Respondents did not believe
that the vertical evacuation structures could increase
their chances of successfully evacuating given the
limited time before the tsunami would arrive. The lack
of community participation in determining the loca-
tion and design of the vertical evacuation structures is
believed to be one of the reasons why, even now,
people do not trust that vertical evacuation structures
Figure 3
a One of the four vertical evacuation buildings in Banda Aceh, b the tsunami museum in Banda Aceh, with an evacuation sign indicating the
entrance, c the memorial site of a stranded ship and d the 2600-ton floating power plant that was swept inland by the tsunami
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can save their lives. In addition, the lack of interest in
these structures has led to poor maintenance of the
facilities (Fig. 4), which are rarely used, even for
social activities, by the residents who live near the
buildings.
Banda Aceh city has made several plans to reduce
the problem of traffic jams during emergency situa-
tions to facilitate evacuation of future disaster.
Tsunami evacuation simulation was conducted (GOTO
et al. 2012b) and some plans have been realized such
as widening existing roads which are to act as escape
roads, and also making emergency crossings on two-
way main roads. This emergency crossing will be
used in emergency situations to shorten U-turns or to
cut the road block so that traffic jams can be avoided
or reduced. Another plan to be implemented in 2015
is to make a flyover on roads with heavy traffic and to
also make an underpass on the designated road that
has been identified by the city government. With
support from the National Agency for Disaster
Management (BNPB) Banda Aceh city has made a
tsunami evacuation road map. This tsunami evacua-
tion road map should be publicized to Banda Aceh
city residents to facilitate proper evacuation for future
disaster mitigation.
4.4. Design of Evacuation Buildings
An evacuation building in Banda Aceh has been
designed with four stories and an overall height of
18 m, and incorporates 54 columns each having a
diameter of 70 cm. The roof includes a helipad for
helicopter landings. In a large-scale tsunami evacua-
tion drill which was held on 2 November 2008, a
helicopter was landed there smoothly. The second
floor has a height of approximately 10 m, as indicated
by the 26 December 2004 tsunami wave height at the
location of the building. The first floor is left open
with no partitions or hollow structures, following the
concept of the mosque. The aim is to avoid the wave
force of future tsunamis. The building can accommo-
date the evacuation of 500 people and is designed to
withstand earthquakes with a moment magnitude of
10 on the Richter scale. The stairs leading to the upper
floor is made of two parts. One main staircase has a
width of approximately 2 m and another one has a
width of 1 m with the slope designed to accommodate
the use of wheel chairs in emergency situations. The
building is also equipped with facilities for emergency
situations. The building serves as a community center
that is surrounded by villagers who are alert and ready
to mitigate the effects of disasters.
5. The Situation in Sri Lanka
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami is remembered as
the most devastating catastrophe in Sri Lanka, having
caused 35,000 fatalities on two-thirds of the coastal
belt, across 13 coastal districts (ADB 2005). The
waves penetrated approximately 500 m inland, on
average, to a maximum of 2 km on the east coast and
Figure 4
a A wooden bar blocking the entrance for disabled persons to the evacuation building and b the first floor of the evacuation building
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with a maximum tsunami runup recorded on the
southern coast over 10 m in Yala (LIU et al. 2005)
and Hambantota (WIJETUNGE 2009). The damage in
Sri Lanka was particularly severe along the coast
from east to south. The damage was dramatically
more significant because no tsunami early warning
system existed in Sri Lanka at the time due to the
country being located very far from active faults.
Since the 2004 event, several individuals and
national and international organizations have sup-
ported the recovery of the damaged areas on a short-
term and long-term basis. Providing food, clothing and
temporary shelter to displaced populations comprised
some of the immediate actions taken by authorities.
Resettlement and reconstruction activities supervised
by the Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Recon-
struction commenced after the completion of the relief
activities (ADB 2005). Reconstruction activities were
further enhanced by short-term and long-term plans
that led to the establishment of a powerful body called
the Disaster Management Center (DMC) in 2005.
However, there have been many challenges regarding
the policy to create urban development strong enough
to withstand future disasters. The 2004 tsunami itself
created the unforgettable example of a lack of
awareness of tsunami events leading to devastating
damage in Sri Lanka even though it was a far-field
tsunami. This occurred, in part, because there are still
very few tsunami experts in Sri Lanka; consequently,
hazard and risk evaluations have been insufficient. Our
group monitored the recovery process in Sri Lanka
from 2010 to 2013 with the cooperation of the Japan
International Cooperation Agency and the Miyagi
Prefecture in Japan. Here, we briefly summarize our
work and discuss the current problems related to the
recovery process and to future tsunami countermea-
sures in Sri Lanka.
5.1. The Current Conditions of Severely Damaged
Areas
Galle City was severely damaged by the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami (Fig. 5). The tsunami runup
height in this city was estimated at 4–5 m (LIU et al.
2005; WIJETUNGE 2009). The placement of tsunami
signs, the designation of hazard zones and disaster
prevention education activities have been conducted
by city authorities, universities and schools. A group
from the Faculty of Engineering at the University of
Ruhuna in Sri Lanka prepared a tsunami hazard map
and evacuation plan for Galle City following the
guidelines that were being used in Japan (Coastal
Development Institute of Technology 2004), and this
was one of the initial activities that led to increasing
people’s tsunami awareness (WIJAYARATNA et al.
2006). However, it is difficult to continue disaster-
prevention activities with a limited budget and
changing levels of awareness of tsunamis in the local
population. This problem is likely to be widespread
among tsunami-affected countries. Consequently, it is
important to determine how to continue disaster-
prevention activities over the long term. For example,
there is a Tsunami Photo Museum in Telwatta
containing thousands of photographs taken during
and after the tsunami as well as paintings by children.
However, the museum is operated by the private
sector, so it is important to determine how to continue
to support such a museum. According to the DMC,
the establishment of a disaster information system has
been completed. However, the hazard map for
various types of natural disasters and the action
agenda for disaster prevention require improvement.
Figure 5
Locations of coastal cities in Sri Lanka mentioned in this study
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Hambantota and Yala are other locations on the
southern coast that were severely affected by the Indian
Ocean tsunami (LIU et al. 2005;GOFF et al. 2006). Being
mostly flatland, Hambantota City was affected by the
tsunami, and a lack of awareness by its people increased
the damage it experienced. During our 2012 visit to Sri
Lanka, we were able to visit Yala, where many
casualties were reported, including 15 foreigners. A
safari tour guide from Yala who was a witness to the
Indian Ocean tsunami stated that the tsunami flow that
came through the lower lands was strong enough to kill
the people who were on the safari tour even though the
Yala area is covered by sand dunes. He further
emphasized that most of the animals in the Yala wild
parkwere safe and that people died because of their lack
of awareness of the event. In addition to localized
reconstructions and developments, the DMC was able
to create a well-planned early warning system for
disasters, including 74 early warning towers that cover
the entire coastal belt of Sri Lanka; the aim of these
towers is to issue tsunami and storm surge warnings.
5.2. The Recovery of Harbor Functions
The damage the Indian Ocean tsunami caused to
coastal infrastructure, ecosystems and the fishery sector
was significant. Nearly 80 % of fishing boats and ten
out of the twelve fishery harbors were badly damaged
(CH2MHill 2006). Hikkaduwa, Mirissa, Galle, Pur-
anawella, Hambantota and Kirinda are harbors that
were considered highly damaged due to the tsunami.
The Kirinda fishery harbor is a good example of
engineering projects that mitigate natural phenomena.
After its initial construction, the harbor faced a serious
problem in 1992: sand accumulation blocked the harbor
entrance. Some civil engineering projects, such as
dredging and the constructionof newbreakwaters,were
introduced to solve the problem, but the problem
continued until before the 2004 tsunami occurred
(Fig. 6). The Kirinda fishery harbor was severely
affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in terms
of both coastal structures and coastal morphology (e.g.,
GOTO et al. 2011; RANASINGHE et al. 2013). During the
tsunami, an approximately 8-m-high tsunami floodwas
recorded, and a large dredging ship called the
Weligowwa was cast ashore. Because of the sand
blockage, bathymetric change was being measured in
detail at regular intervals. The last measurement before
the tsunamiwas taken inNovember 2004. Post-tsunami
bathymetry was measured from February to March
2005. According to GOTO et al. (2011) and RANASINGHE
et al. (2013), the first runup tsunami wave transported
large amounts of offshore, sea bottom sediment and
deposited it in a layer up to 4 m thick along the
shoreface slope. Bathymetry values returned to normal
by November 2005, approximately 1 year after the
tsunami. After the tsunami, sand accumulation began
again, and sand blockage had re-occurred by 2006.
Because the harbor was an important facility for
fishermen, dredging work has been conducted such
that, as of 2013, the harbor is in use.
In the case of Kirinda, the tsunami’s impact on
bathymetry was limited, and it recovered very
quickly. However, several studies have reported that
coastal geomorphology has not fully recovered from
the 2011 Tohoku-oki tsunami (UDO et al. 2013). It is
very important that we understand what determines
whether coastal geomorphology recovers.
5.3. Scientific and Technological Support
from Japan
In this project, the Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) led a collaboration with the Miyagi
prefectural government and Tohoku University. The
project was implemented for 3 years in 2009, 2010 and
2012. To expand the understanding of city planning in
preparation for future disasters in Sri Lanka, Japanese
knowledge of disaster-prevention-specific activities in
the region was taught to trainees from Sri Lanka. The
goals were the comprehensive support and practice of
science and technology, the practice of disaster preven-
tion, enlightenment and education. During their training
in Japan, trainees learned basic disaster prevention,
disaster history and the primary countermeasures and
current challenges in both countries. The trainees are
expected to contribute to disaster prevention and
mitigation activities in Sri Lanka. In addition, education
on earthquake and tsunami disaster prevention assis-
tance in Sri Lanka was provided through seminars and
workshops, the presentation and sharing of information,
the exchangeof ideas and the presentationof challenges.
A tsunami deposit site visit to assess the risk of low
frequency hazards will also be required in the future. In
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addition, disaster prevention education, awareness-
raising activities and community-based disaster man-
agement activities in schools and the education
community, based on the Participatory Technology
Assessment (PTA), were organized with local profes-
sionals. Some examples of our activities, such as a field
survey of reconstruction conditions and disaster risk
reduction activities are shown in Fig. 7.
5.4. Problems with Preserving Monuments
Unlike Indonesia and Thailand, Sri Lanka does
not have a damaged structure that has been preserved
as a tsunami monument. One possible monument is a
train named ‘‘the queen of the sea’’ that was hit by the
2004 tsunami with more than 1700 passengers
aboard; they became casualties due to their belief
that the train would be strong enough to withstand the
tsunami. This became the deadliest train disaster in
recorded history. Nevertheless, this train might be too
emotionally difficult for the local people to preserve
as a monument. This example demonstrates the
importance of disaster risk education for local people.
Among the tsunami memorials that were constructed,
the memorial at Peraliya in the Galle district is still in
good condition and has become an attraction for
tourists as well. This memorial was constructed in
remembrance of the people who died in the train
accident. The remaining cars of the damaged train
had been kept in Peraliya but were then moved to
Hikkaduwa and kept there for some time. The train
was repaired and put into service, and it ran the same
trip on 26 December 2008 as a memorial to the
people who lost their lives. In Yala, a resort hotel and
most of the vegetation were severely damaged by the
tsunami (GOFF et al. 2006). After this disaster, the
remnants of the bungalow were preserved, and a
tsunami monument was constructed in 2005.
Figure 6
Bathymetric changes in the Kirinda fishery harbor in 1995, 2004, 2009 and 2013. [Image source: Lanka Hydraulic Institute Ltd (LHI) and
Google earth]
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However, as seen in Fig. 8, part of the painted writing
on the monument disappeared in 2012, and it is
difficult to read the text. Although it is very important
to memorialize the tsunami disaster by visiting the
monument, its preservation is even more important.
6. The Situation in Thailand
6.1. General Observations and Future Challenges
in Each Location
A significant change in Thailand after the 2004
tsunami was the establishment of the National
Disaster Warning Center (NDWC). The NDWC
obtains disaster observation data from the Thai
Meteorological Department (TMD) and other inter-
national organizations and acts as the center for
disaster warning in Thailand. Using this system, a
tsunami warning can be issued in Thailand within
5 min after an earthquake occurs. In the six provinces
that were damaged by the 2004 tsunami, there are also
many examples of change, such as the preparation of
tsunami hazard maps and tsunami signs and the
construction of tsunami evacuation buildings. Field
visits were organized in 2009 and 2013 in areas shown
in Fig. 9 in collaboration with the TMD, the NDWC,
the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation
Figure 7
Interviews on disaster response and recovery conditions in Galle City and practicing survival (making rice using cans)
Figure 8
a A steel monument and b a tsunami memorial in 2005 at the Yala safari bungalow
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(DDPM) and the Regional Integrated Multi-Hazard
Early Warning System for Africa and Asia (RIMES).
6.1.1 Nam Khem Village, Phang Nga Province
Nam Khem was one of the worst-hit areas in
Thailand, where more than a thousand lives were
lost as a result of flooding by a 10-m-high tsunami
wave. Most villagers were fishermen or worked in
aquaculture and sightseeing. A tsunami museum and
memorial were constructed near the coast, containing
pictures, damage information and a list of the victims.
Another tsunami memorial was made out of two large
fishery boats that were transported inland by the
Figure 9
Locations in Phang Nga and Phuket, Thailand mentioned in this study
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tsunami, killing people and destroying houses. The
population in Nam Khem village has since decreased,
and the tsunami evacuation plan has been very much
improved. A number of activities such as tsunami
evacuation drills, reconstruction forums, and disaster-
related lectures are being conducted here, and
residents are well-prepared and highly aware com-
pared to other areas. They have their own tsunami
evacuation drills and emergency plans. A sea obser-
vation team will check on the receding wave when
they receive a warning. This procedure is risky and
dangerous because it is not necessarily the case that a
tsunami will be preceded by drawdown (SUPPASRI
2010). Education regarding to the correct basic
understanding of tsunamis is still needed. A patrol
team will monitor residents’ property. A traffic team
will implement their own rules during evacuation,
having pedestrians keep left and vehicles keep right.
A rescue team will check every house for remaining
and possibly disabled residents. A nursing team will
provide first aid. The school was moved further from
the sea and to higher ground as a result of previous
experience. The evacuation route for vehicles is the
main road (a 2-lane road). Two types of evacuation
drills are conducted, and the residents understand the
problems that occur when they have to evacuate in
the rain or during nighttime. As a result, their
evacuation process in response to the tsunami event
on 11 April 2012 was a complete success, without
any problems or traffic jams. Nam Khem serves as a
good example of a tsunami disaster-resilient commu-
nity. In 2013, the tsunami memorial park looks
similar to what was observed in 2009; however, the
two fishing boat memorials (Fig. 10a) have been
seriously deteriorated by corrosion due to a lack of
maintenance. In addition, tsunami-related signs, such
as hazard maps, tsunami height indicators and
evacuation direction signs, have faded due to sunlight
and other weathering processes (Fig. 10b).
6.1.2 Pakarang Cape, Phang Nga Province
The tsunami evacuation building in Pakarang Cape
(Fig. 11a) is adjacent to the beach, in compliance
with the safe zone distance of more than 1 km, and
there is no greenbelt to dissipate tsunami energy.
Construction began for the evacuation shelter in
March 2009 and was completed in November 2009.
There is a sign there that indicates the 2004 tsunami
level of 5 m, but the actual height of the sign is
approximately 1 m. In this area, local residents find a
height of 5 m difficult to imagine (SUPPASRI 2010).
This may lead to an underestimation of the tsunami
hazard. Therefore, the height of the sign should be set
equal to the height of the tsunami. A detailed study of
tsunami evacuation simulation in this area, including
the mentioned evacuation building, can be seen from
a study by MAS et al. (2015-the same issue).
6.1.3 Khao Lak Area, Phang Nga Province
Khao Lak is the most popular tourist area in the
Phang Nga province, where a large number of non-
Thai tourists were killed by the tsunami. Many hotels
and resorts were also destroyed by the tsunami but
had been fully reconstructed a few years after the
tsunami. When the tsunami occurred, the water police
patrol boat T.813 was on its way to secure one of the
royal families and was swept inland across the main
road, which is located approximately 2 km from the
sea. Some of the boat’s crew, including the captain,
survived. The boat is now preserved as a tsunami
memorial similar to those in Nam Khem village.
Tsunami evacuation signs in both Thai and English
were erected in many places in Khao Lak to maintain
tsunami awareness. Figure 12a shows the undevel-
oped area containing the boat memorial with a
wooden bridge crossing the river in 2009. By 2013
(Fig. 12b), the bridge structure had become concrete,
and the area near the boat had been developed and
now contains a memorial park, exhibition hall, travel
center and other activity spaces.
6.1.4 Patong Beach, Phuket Province
Patong Beach is one of the most popular tourist areas
in Phuket and contains many hotels, shops and
restaurants. The tsunami in 2004 was not as high
there as in Phang Nga. Therefore, only the first floors
of buildings were damaged, and the tsunami only
reached approximately 300 m inland. There are also a
large number of tsunami signs in Patong. Large
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numbers of tourists stay in the tsunami hazard zone or
spend most of their time there. Although evacuation
signs are located every 300, 200 and 100 m from the
beach to the safe zone, some of them are not well
maintained. Moreover, the evacuation route planned
by the local government goes through private prop-
erty and is full of shops and stalls that could lead to a
difficult evacuation. The traffic jam in Patong was the
most serious among the 2004 tsunami-affected areas.
Traffic jams occur daily during rush hour in the
morning and evening. One reason for these traffic
jams is the large number of motorcycles that are
rented by tourists. The three evacuation shelters
comprise a school, a temple and a market. All of
these shelters are located more than 1 km from the
sea. The school appears to be the most suitable shelter
because of its space and accessibility. The tsunami
warning in 2012 (without a damaging tsunami)
confirmed that this situation is very hazardous. The
warning occurred during the peak traffic period. As a
result, all traffic was at a standstill from the top of the
mountain to the road along the beach, inside the 2004
tsunami inundation zone. Figures 13 and 14 show the
one-way traffic routes in Patong beach, which extend
Figure 10
a Corrosion of a memorial fishing boat and b poor maintenance of tsunami-related signs in Nam Khem village
Figure 11
Tsunami evacuation building in Pakarang Cape (a) during construction in 2009 and (b) in 2013
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in a clockwise direction, going north along the
shoreline and south on the inner road. Most of the
small roads that link these two roads extend toward
the sea except for one road that extends inland. The
direction of these small roads is one of the reasons for
the traffic jam, and the traffic rules during tsunami
evacuations in Patong must be improved in prepara-
tion for future tsunamis.
6.2. Geological and Environmental Changes
6.2.1 Tsunami boulders at Pakarang Cape
The tsunami in 2004 transported thousands of
meters-long boulders shoreward at Pakarang Cape,
Thailand. GOTO et al. (2007) investigated the size,
position and long-axis orientation of 467 boulders
on the cape. Most of the boulders found on the cape
were well rounded, ellipsoid and without sharp,
broken edges. They were fragments of reef rocks,
and their sizes were estimated to be an average of
14 m3 (22.7 t). GOTO et al. (2007) calculated the
tsunami inundation at Pakarang Cape. They sug-
gested that the tsunami waves, which were directed
eastward, struck both reef rocks and coral colonies
that were originally located on the shallow sea
bottom near the reef edge; these detached, and the
boulders were transported shoreward. During our
visit in February 2013 (Fig. 15a), the boulders were
still there. Conversely, sand accumulation was
remarkable on the tidal bench, and the beach berm
had quickly recovered.
Figure 12
The T.813 patrol boat as a tsunami memorial (a) in 2009 and (b) in 2013
Figure 13
Map of Patong beach; the 2004 tsunami inundation depth (blue),
buildings (gray), roads (red) and one-way traffic routes (arrows)
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6.2.2 Tsunami Deposits in Bang Sak Beach
JANKAEW et al. (2008) was the first group who
discovered paleo-tsunami deposits prior to the 2004
event in Thailand. Although after a decade, there are
well-preserved 2004 tsunami deposits on Bang Sak
Beach. This area includes a beach and shallow marine
sediments with abundant marine plankton. GOTO et al.
(2012a) conducted field surveys in March 2005 and
December 2008 in southwestern Thailand to inves-
tigate local variation in the thickness and the
preservation potential of onshore deposits formed
by the 2004 tsunami. The 2008 survey results
revealed that the thickness of deposits varied by a
few centimeters in pits located less than 10 m apart
because of the local undulation of the topography and
possible bioturbation. At 13 of the 24 sites, the
difference in thickness between the 2005 and 2008
surveys was within the range of local variation. In
fact, very thin tsunami deposits (1 cm thick) in the
2005 survey were well preserved during the 2008
survey. Furthermore, tsunami deposits near the
maximum inundation limit were found in the 2008
survey, with thicknesses that were consistent with
those reported in the 2005 survey. At no site was a
tsunami deposit eliminated completely. Based on
these observations, GOTO et al. (2012a) inferred that
tsunami deposits tend to be well preserved, even in a
tropical climate with heavy rains, such as that of
Thailand. Our visit in 2013 further supports the
Figure 14
Traffic direction in Patong beach (a) in the south and (b) in the north
Figure 15
Remaining geological evidence at Pakarang Cape, a tsunami boulders and b tsunami sand deposits
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observation by GOTO et al. (2012a), insofar as we
observed that the deposits were well preserved in
cases where there were no human disturbances
(Fig. 12b).
6.2.3 Mangrove Forests at Pakarang Cape
YANAGISAWA et al. (2009) investigated the damage to
mangroves caused by the 2004 tsunami at Pakarang
Cape. Comparing pre- and post-tsunami satellite
imagery of the study area, they found that approx-
imately 70 % of the mangrove forest was destroyed
by the tsunami. Based on field observations, they
determined that the survival rate of mangroves
increased with increasing stem diameter. Specifically,
they found that 72 % of Rhizophora trees with a
25–30 cm stem diameter survived the tsunami
impact, whereas only 19 % of the trees with a
15–20 cm stem diameter survived. After the tsunami,
the mangrove forest was not replanted, and parts of
the forest became resort areas.
7. The Situation in the Maldives
In comparison to other countries, such as
Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand, the Maldives
experienced less damage not only because of their
geological setting but mainly because of their geo-
logical features: the coral atolls with small islands
separated by deep channels (FRITZ et al. 2006). Even
though the tsunami arrived 4 h after the Maldives, a
9 m runup resulted in 300 fatalities in Somalia (FRITZ
and BORRERO 2006). However, if we compare the
displaced population with the total population of the
Maldives, the damage was very significant. Although
the elevation of the entire island chain is lower than
2 m, the 26 December tsunami had a limited impact
on the Maldives due to its unique geological features
as mentioned earlier. In addition, because of the
country’s low elevation, the tsunami could com-
pletely overtop or submerge the island. Therefore,
there was no runup process amplifying the tsunami as
high as 8 m in Sri Lanka (LIU et al. 2005) and the
maximum tsunami height observed in the Maldives
was only up to 4.1 m (FRITZ et al. 2006). A field visit
to discuss the present countermeasures prepared by
the central and local governments and to observe the
present condition of the Maldives was held from 23
to 29 December 2013 with support from the Asian
Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC).
7.1. General Observations
Male, the capital city (Fig. 16), with an area of
1 9 2 km2, was the main target area for our official
visits. The city was protected during the 1990s by
seawalls and breakwaters (Fig. 17a) that were built
before the 2004 tsunami; however, measures for
supporting evacuation during future tsunamis were
not observed. Unlike in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and
Thailand, there were no tsunami-related signs to
provide information on the tsunami hazard zone, the
tsunami height, evacuation routes or evacuation
buildings. On the 9-year anniversary of the tsunami
(26 December 2013), there were no major events in
Male except several news reports, but there were some
small events on other islands. There was no sign
indicating the tsunami memorial monument shown in
Fig. 17b. This picture was taken on the anniversary,
and the monument was no busier than on other days.
The main road along the shoreline, which links the
entire city, is a one-way street, similar to the roads in
Patong beach in Phuket, Thailand. The two-lane road
is always crowded with parked cars and motorcycles
that could obstruct evacuation (Fig. 18a, b). The small
streets that link the main road to the inland are narrow
and obstructed by many objects on the ground. In
addition, although most buildings along the shoreline
have at least two stories, there are no signs indicating
tsunami evacuation shelters. The coast guard building
and other government buildings near the shoreline
could be used as evacuation buildings.
7.2. Central Government Offices
Meetings with several offices of the central
governmental were conducted to investigate the
ongoing disaster risk reduction efforts of each
organization—namely, the Maldives National
Defense Force (MNDF), the Ministry of Education
(ME), the Ministry of Tourism (MT), the Ministry of
Housing and Infrastructure (MHI) and the Maldives
Meteorological Service (MMS).
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Figure 16
Locations of atolls and islands in the Maldives mentioned in this study
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The MNDF is the most important of these
agencies because it has the necessary manpower and
facilities that can be used during an emergency. It
would be one of the first teams to reach the affected
areas to solve physical problems and support further
activities. However, some of its assets that can be
used in case of emergency, such as speed boats,
seaplanes and helicopters, will encounter logistical
problems because the country contains numerous
islands and a limited budget for new assets.
Response time is likely the most important factor
in an emergency. The shorter the response time of
the MNDF it, the more time that is available for
other activities, such as the medical team response,
the receipt of supporting materials and volunteer
work.
Figure 17
a Seawall and breakwater in the south of Male and b memorial statue of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Male
Figure 18
a Crowded traffic during rush hour in the road along the coast and b an evacuation route that is blocked by parked motorcycles
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The ME is now attempting to implement a
disaster-related curriculum in schools starting at the
kindergarten level because children may have to lead
adults to evacuate in future disasters. For example,
during the 2004 tsunami in Thailand, a young British
girl helped more than a hundred people evacuate and
survive. The ministry is also adapting the teaching
materials so that they will be interesting to children.
At present, good practices have been integrated
into tourism—i.e., a brief introduction to disaster-
related information is provided at check-in at each
resort. The MT considers the total exposed popula-
tion (the local population plus the number of tourists)
to be sustainable. Because tourism is the main
economic sector in the country, the MT is now
addressing any type of disaster that might interrupt
tourism activities. Information related to disasters
should also be well disseminated because tourists are
more sensitive to the media, which mainly focus on
bad news.
The MHI is the key ministry for long-term
reconstruction insofar as its work is related to daily
life. Some problems identified during the interview
were (1) the lack of logistics for importing construc-
tion resources from nearby countries (e.g., India or
the Middle East), (2) the lack of skilled manpower,
(3) the necessity of group relocation to reduce
construction costs for basic infrastructure and (4)
the necessity of providing education to people who
receive compensatory money but who spend it to
meet different objectives. To solve one of these
problems, the MHI is now encouraging children to
relocate to bigger islands for a better education. If
this occurs, parents must follow their children, and
infrastructure construction costs can be reduced.
Although the MMS does not have its own warning
system and must rely on other international services,
the present warning and observation systems appear
to be sufficient. In terms of tsunami warning, the
MMS has a network linked to all four major
institutions that take measurements in the Indian
Ocean. Warning information from these institutions,
such as the expected tsunami arrival time and
amplitude, is sufficient for such short-term measures;
however, for the long term, more detailed informa-
tion, such as hazard maps for predicted future events,
may be necessary. The warning dissemination
method still appears to pose problems. A communi-
cation network and a commitment to use it during a
disaster should be established to disseminate vital
information, which should be made more easily
understandable for less educated people.
7.3. Relocated Residents and Local Stakeholders
A field site visit was organized to observe and
interview local residents and stakeholders. Thulusd-
hoo Island, the capital of the Kaafu Atoll, was
selected as the target area because of its large
proportion of relocated residents from other islands
affected by the 2004 tsunami—340 out of the total
population of 1361 on the island. The island is
approximately 25 km northeast of Male. Typical
disasters in Thulusdhoo Island are storm surges,
floods and coastal erosion; however, the island was
hit by waves 1–2 m high during the 2004 tsunami.
After the tsunami, the government requested that
some companies move off the island, and the
factories were used as temporary shelters for 4 years.
Figure 19a shows that the deserted areas remained
the same for 9 years. New houses were constructed
with donations from Saudi Arabia to those who used
to own land before the tsunami, as shown in Fig. 19b.
The island is small, and the sea is a 5–10 min
walk from the center of the island. There is only one
reinforced concrete high-rise building (Fig. 20a) for
tsunami evacuation on the island, which belongs to
the MNDF. This building has speakers on the roof
to issue warnings. During the day of our visit, we
attended a disaster resilience workshop held by the
MNDF in this building. Participants were asked to
create an exposure map, a hazard map and an
evacuation map for each type of hazard (Fig. 20b).
Residents on this island appear to have a high
awareness of disasters as a result of the 2004
tsunami.
Interviews were organized with the local residents
who lost their houses in the 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami and relocated to Thulusdhoo Island. The
government gave them a choice of three possible
islands for their relocation. All of the residents are
satisfied with their new homes, and they have better
economic opportunities. Although 9 years have
passed since the 2004 tsunami, residents still have a
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high awareness and a strong will to participate in
disaster-related activities. However, there has been a
problem regarding the amount of space in residents’
new houses. Because extended families commonly
live together in this country, often one house with
three rooms cannot accommodate the size of a
household.
A meeting was organized with representatives
from schools, health centers, the police force and the
atoll council. Although the local people are satisfied
with the present conditions, the stakeholders who
attended the meeting are not because the facilities and
infrastructure do not meet the standards to which the
government had committed itself. The population
size has been increasing, but the capacity of institu-
tions such as schools and health centers has remained
the same. In particular, the stakeholders indicated the
need to upgrade the health center to a hospital. At the
moment, there is still a lack of necessary medical
equipment. These problems resemble those experi-
enced in the areas mentioned in the previous section,
where the country’s geography makes it difficult for
the central government to reach remote areas and
provide support.
Figure 19
The present conditions of a deserted temporary shelters and b reconstructed houses in Thulusdhoo Island
Figure 20
a The MNDF building and b an example of a tsunami evacuation route map made by residents in Thulusdhoo Island
3336 A. Suppasri et al. Pure Appl. Geophys.
8. Conclusion
Based on the findings obtained during our visits
to the target countries, we identified the three key
issues that reflect the preparedness of these areas
and the future challenges that exist 10 years after
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. For this long
interval event, it is necessary to prepare resilient
communities for future generations monitoring such
progress. In addition, the progress achieved in
disaster preparedness after 3 years of reconstruction
was compared to that achieved after 10 years and
evaluated based on experience in disaster recon-
struction in Japan.
8.1. Town Reconstruction and Land Use Planning
The countries in our study area were similar in
terms of the installation of tsunami warning signs
and the construction of tsunami evacuation shelters,
which were constructed while town reconstruction
was occurring. In general, the town reconstructions
in most of the countries in our study were
completed within a few years after the 2004
tsunami, except in the Maldives, where the logistics
of obtaining building materials appeared to be the
most important factor causing the delay. Improving
the logistics system for a country that contains
many islands is a challenge. In addition, the
country contains a large number of small islands
on coral atolls without building materials apart
from the corals. In terms of land use planning,
there have been no major changes in the popular
sightseeing areas, such as those in Thailand and the
Maldives. However, future disaster-related property
loss is expected to be larger than that from the
2004 event along the Andaman coast of Thailand
because that area is more exposed due to the larger
number of hotels and resorts. In addition, serious
traffic jams might occur similar to those experi-
enced in 2012. For tourism-designated islands in
the Maldives, where the number of tourists is
significant, taking into account the expected num-
ber of tourists appears to be one of the most
important measures for emergency response.
8.2. Warning Systems and Emergency Response
Tsunami warning services can be classified into
three categories: (1) a regional service (Indonesia),
(2) a national service (Thailand) and (3) the need for
information from other regional service countries (the
Maldives and Sri Lanka). After the 2004 tsunami, the
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) acted as
the center for tsunami warnings in the Indian Ocean
for several years, but currently, this service is being
provided by regional tsunami service providers in
Australia, India and Indonesia and by other regional
services, such as RIMES. Thailand has a national
service provided by the NDWC. Sri Lanka and the
Maldives do not have their own services, but they
receive warning messages from the aforementioned
regional service countries. This approach appears to
be sufficient in terms of tsunami evacuation. A
tsunami evacuation drill is performed yearly and
simultaneously in all study areas to test their tsunami
warning systems. Nevertheless, further research and
development of tsunami-related topics, such as land
use planning in preparation for future tsunamis using
detailed probabilistic tsunami hazard maps and
vulnerability functions, are needed.
8.3. Disaster Reduction Education and Other
Disaster-Awareness-Related Topics
Disaster reduction education is an issue to which all
countries in our study area gave considerable attention
during the beginning stages of reconstruction. Basic
knowledge of disasters was added to school curricula,
and workshops and lectures were organized in cooper-
ation with both national and international organizations.
These efforts will help local people understand the
meaning ofwarnings and the proper action to take during
an evacuation. Furthermore, tsunami museums and
tsunami memorials have been built in most locations.
There are some differences among the countries; for
example, Indonesia and Thailand succeeded in main-
taining some marine vessels that were carried ashore as
memorials, but this was not the case for the damaged
train in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, these attempts will help
maintain awareness of the 2004 disaster. Geological
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evidence will also maintain people’s awareness. The
number of boulders that remains in Thailand is a good
example for telling the story of the 2004 tsunami.
8.4. Evaluation of the 2004 Affected Countries Using
the Four Main Components of Disaster
Reconstruction
We further evaluated reconstruction after the
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami based on observations
from our field visits using the four main components
of disaster reconstruction [Disaster Prevention
Research Institute (DPRI) 2004]. This type of long-
term reconstruction plan is based on experience with
historical disasters in Japan, including the 1611
Keicho-Sanriku tsunami and the 1854 Ansei-Nankai
tsunami. The four components are described below.
1. Town reconstruction and planning (Living): town
and regional planning conducted alongside hous-
ing reconstruction.
2. Self-reliance and linkage (Communication): com-
munication during normal and emergency periods
among local residents, their self-reliance, the
linkages among them and evacuation drills.
3. Community and local industry formation (Occu-
pation): recovery of local industries and related
facilities.
4. Disaster education and culture (Experience trans-
fer): Maintenance of disaster awareness and
research on disaster observations and assessments.
Our evaluations of the early-stage reconstruction
period (within three years after the 2004 tsunami, as
introduced in Sect. 2, and reconstruction after a
decade, as discussed in Sects. 4, 5, 6, 7, are shown in
Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
Using three symbols and their accompanying
definitions—(▬) ongoing, existing with some
limitations, and well-prepared—and Thailand as
an example, explanations are presented below.
1. Town reconstruction and planning: (▲) (▲) 
The reconstruction of houses and hotels was
completed in most areas during the first stage,
but problems with evacuation routes and disaster
zoning remain after 10 years.
Table 1
Evaluation of the 2004 tsunami-affected countries using the four main components of disaster reconstruction [after 3 years (i.e., the early-
stage reconstruction period): Sect. 2]
Four components
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami-affected countries
Indonesia Sri Lanka Thailand The Maldives
Town reconstruction and planning ▲ ▲ ▲ ▬
Self-reliance and linkage ▬ ▲ ▲ ▲
Community and local industry formation ▲ ▲ ▲ ▬
Disaster education and culture ▬ ▬ ▬ ▬
(▬) Ongoing, exists with some limitations, well prepared
Table 2
Evaluation of the 2004 tsunami-affected countries using the four main components of disaster reconstruction (after a decade: Sects. 4, 5, 6, 7)
Four components
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami-affected countries
Indonesia Sri Lanka Thailand The Maldives
Town reconstruction and planning ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲
Self-reliance and linkage ▲ ● ● ▲
Community and local industry formation ● ● ● ▲
Disaster education and culture ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲
(▲) (▲) Ongoing, (▲) (●) exists with some limitations, (▬) (▲) well prepared
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2. Self-reliance and linkage: (▲) (●)
The performance of tsunami warnings has been
improved from 20 min after earthquake occur-
rence during the early stage of NDWC
reconstruction to less than 5 min after a decade.
Evacuation drills are organized every year and
receive positive feedback and cooperation from
local residents.
3. Community and local industry formation: (▲) (●)
The recovery of hotels and other tourism-related
businesses was completed in most areas a few
years after the tsunami, and they were fully
operational after 10 years.
4. Disaster education and culture: (▬) (▲)
During the early stage, a framework for disaster
education was applied in some university-level
curricula, but not at the lower pre-university
levels. Some damaged structures were preserved
as tsunami monuments, but most of these have
been poorly maintained.
We hope that our evaluation results will be used
as indicators for a regional comparative study of
disaster reconstruction and that they can be applied to
evaluate progress in disaster preparedness for other
disaster events in the future.
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